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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE NUMBER 1 
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it determined that Mrs. Nordgren 
filed a "Claim" in the context of Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4), Utah's Loss of 
Consortium Statute, when she served her Notice of Intent to Commence Action on 
Appellees? (Issue preserved R. at 127(11-12, 20-22.) 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's ruling on Appellees9 motion to dismiss is reviewed for 
correctness. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. 
ISSUE NUMBER 2 
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it concluded that Utah Code Ann. 
§30-2-11(4) required Appellant to file his loss of consortium claim on the same day his 
wife served her Notice of Intent to Commence Litigation? (Issue preserved at R. at 42-46, 
R. at 45 (footnote 2), R. at 123-125 and R. at 127(8-12, 20-22).) 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's ruling on Appellees' motion to dismiss is reviewed for 
correctness. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson,, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. 
1 
ISSUE NUMBER 3 
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it concluded that the Utah 
Healthcare Malpractice Act applied to Appellant's loss of consortium claim? (Issue 
preserved R. at 42-46, R. at 45 (footnote 2), R. at 123-125 and R. at 127(8-12, 20-22).) 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's ruling on Appellees' motion to dismiss is reviewed for 
correctness. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson,, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Judge Wallace A. Lee's Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On September 15, 2008, Appellant filed a Complaint in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, seeking damages for loss of consortium. (R. at 1-6.) Appellant's loss of 
consortium claim stems from damages that his wife, Mrs. Nordgren, claims to have 
suffered as a result of medical care provided by Appellees. (R. at 1-6.) Mrs. Nordgren's 
claims were not joined with the claims filed by Appellant in court. Instead, Mrs. 
Nordgren was required to pursue her claims against Appellees through binding 
arbitration, based on the terms of a Dispute Resolution Agreement that Mrs. Nordgren 
entered at the time she originally received care from one of the Appellees1. (R. at 36-38.) 
1
 At the same time Appellant filed his Complaint, he also attempted to join in the 
Arbitration. Appellees have resisted his attempts to join in that proceeding as well. 
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Before she was aware that she had signed the Dispute Resolution Agreement, Mrs. 
Nordgren began the pre-litigation process pursuant to the Utah Healthcare Malpractice 
Act (the "Malpractice Act") by serving a Notice of Intent to Commence Action on 
Appellees. (R. at 36-38.) When Appellees made Mrs. Nordgren aware of the existence of 
the Dispute Resolution Agreement, she abandoned the pre-litigation process (before ever 
appearing before a pre-litigation panel or filing a complaint) and agreed to arbitrate her 
claims against Appellees. (R. at 36-38.) 
After Appellant brought his loss of consortium claim, Dr. Blomquist responded to 
the Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss on December 29, 2008. (R. at 16-18.) In 
his motion, Dr. Blomquist argued that Appellant's loss of consortium claim should be 
dismissed because Appellant was required, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4), to 
file his claim at the time Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice of Intent to Commence Action. 
(R. at 16-18 and R. at 19-31.) On December 30, 2008, Dr. Brown and the Clinic 
subsequently joined in the Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 13-15 and R. at 112.) On January 
23, 2009, Appellant filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 
at 35-61.) On February 11, 2009, Dr. Blomquist filed his Reply Memorandum (R. at 62-
104.), and Dr. Brown and the Clinic filed a Joinder in Reply Supporting Dr. Blomquist's 
Motion to Dismiss (R. at R. 108-111.) 
Appellants right to participate in the arbitration proceeding was not before the trial court, 
was not a subject of the trial court's order and is not before the Court of Appeals. 
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Oral Argument on Appellees' Motion to Dismiss was made before the trial court 
on June 1, 2009. (R. at 119, R. at 120 and R. at 1272.) On July 28, 2009, the trial court 
granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Motion to Dismiss (the "Memorandum Decision"). In the Memorandum Decision, 
the trial court concluded the following: (1) Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent to 
Commence an Action constitutes a malpractice action under Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-
403(16); (2) Mrs. Nordren's Notice of Intent to Commence Action constitutes a claim 
under Utah's loss of consortium statute, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4); (3) Appellant was 
required under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) to file his Complaint on the same day that 
Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice of Intent to Commence Action; (4) Appellant's claim 
for loss of consortium made in his Complaint was untimely, and should be dismissed, 
because he did not file his Complaint at the time Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice of 
Intent to Commence Action. (R. at 120-126.) 
On August 20, 2009, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. at 128-129.) On 
September 21, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. 
(R. at 134.) On September 28, 2009, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Disposition 
On October 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Disposition. 
III. Statement of Facts 
2
 The Official Transcript from the June 1, 2009 oral argument is Page 127 of the record 
and comprises twenty-three (23) pages. Reference to the transcript shall herein refer to 
the indexed page in the Record and the specific page of the transcript, e.g. (R. at 
127(13).) 
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On September 18, 2006, Mrs. Nordgren was diagnosed with colorectal cancer. 
Approximately nine months prior to this diagnosis, Mrs. Nordgren had visited Dr. Brown 
at the Clinic and complained of symptoms consistent with colon cancer. Dr. Brown and 
his nursing staff at the Clinic assumed Mrs. Nordgren's symptoms were related to kidney 
stones and ordered a CT Scan of Mrs. Nordgren's abdomen and pelvis. (R. at 2.) On 
December 21, 2005, Dr. Blomquist reviewed the CT Scan and confirmed that Jennie had 
kidney stones. Dr. Blomquist failed to notice, however, that the CT Scan also revealed a 
mass in Mrs. Nordgren's rectum. (R. at 1-6, 36-38.) 
Mrs. Nordgren contends that Dr. Brown, Dr. Blomquist and the staff of the Sevier 
Valley Family Clinic breached their respective standards of care, and as a result, failed to 
timely diagnose Mrs. Nordgren's cancer. (R. at 1-6,36-38.) Because Mrs. Nordgren was 
not diagnosed with cancer in December of 2005, the cancer was allowed to continue to 
grow and spread, untreated, for over ten months. When Mrs. Nordgren was eventually 
diagnosed, the cancer had progressed to a stage 4. It has since spread from her rectum to 
her liver. (R. at 1-6,36-38.) 
Prior to Mrs. Nordgren's diagnosis of cancer, Appellant was working as a real 
estate agent and a part-time developer. (R. at 4.) In the years preceding his wife's 
diagnosis, Appellant had success in his profession and was able to comfortably provide 
for his wife and their four children. However, while Mrs. Nordgren was fighting both 
colon and liver cancer, she was largely unable to care for her children or her home. 
Appellant assumed most, if not all, of his wife's responsibilities she had as a stay-at-
home parent. (R. at 4.) For example, Appellant assisted his children in the morning to 
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get ready for school, drove them to and from school, prepared all their meals, helped with 
homework, bathed them and tucked them in at night. (R. at 4.) These duties, coupled 
with the emotional strain Appellant was feeling concerning his wife's health, severely 
impacted his ability to work and earn a living. Consequently, the Nordgrens lost their 
home, their two cars and have moments when they have no money to feed their children. 
(R. at 4.) 
On June 12, 2007, Mrs. Nordgren began pursuing her medical malpractice claims 
against Appellees. (R. at 20 and R. at 37.) She did so by serving a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action pursuant to the pre-litigation requirements contained in the 
Malpractice Act. (R. at 20 and R. at 37.) At the time, Mrs. Nordgren was unaware that 
she had signed the Dispute Resolution Agreement. When she learned from Dr. Brown of 
the existence of the Dispute Resolution Agreement, she withdrew her request for pre-
litigation review and agreed to pursue her claims through binding arbitration. (R. at 20 
and R. at 37.) Mrs. Nordgren never completed the pre-litigation process outlined in the 
Malpractice Act and never filed a complaint against Appellees. (R. at 37.) 
On September 11, 2008, Appellant attempted to join the arbitration proceeding by 
serving the Notice of Claim upon Appellees pursuant to the terms of the Dispute 
Resolution Agreement. On September 11, 2008, Appellant also filed his Complaint with 
the Sixth District Court. (R. at 1-5.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed three separate reversible errors when it dismissed 
Appellant's Complaint. First, the trial court failed to recognize the difference between a 
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Notice of Intent to Commence Action and a malpractice action, when it ruled that Mrs. 
Nordgren filed a malpractice action by serving her Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
on Appellees, and that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent to Commence Action constituted 
a claim under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). Second, the trial court committed reversible 
error when it concluded that Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) required Appellant to file his 
Complaint on the same day as his injured spouse filed her Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action. Finally, the trial court committed reversible error when it ruled that Appellant's 
loss of consortium claim is governed by the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
The fundamental errors in the trial court's decision all stem from its conclusion 
that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent to Commence Action is actually a malpractice 
action under the terms of the Malpractice Act. In order to reach this conclusion, the trial 
court ignored the plain language of Section 78B-3-412(l) of the Malpractice Act, which 
makes a clear distinction between a Notice of Intent to Commence an Action and a 
complaint. 
The trial court further compounded this error by concluding that Mrs. Nordgren's 
Notice of Intent to Commence Action constitutes a "claim" for purposes of Utah Code 
Ann. §30-2-11(4), and in turn, that Appellant lost his right to proceed with his loss of 
consortium claim because he did not file suit on the same day his wife made her "claim". 
This interpretation of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) is contrary to 
Utah law, precedent from other jurisdictions, and well-established standards of statutory 
interpretation. 
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As an additional point of error, the Trial Court ruled that Appellant's loss of 
consortium claim fails under the restrictive umbrella of the Malpractice Act. This 
conclusion is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT 
50,94P.3d915. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT MRS. NORDGREN FILED A "CLAIM" IN THE 
CONTEXT OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(4) WHEN SHE SERVED 
HER NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION. 
Appellant's complaint is based on Utah's loss of consortium statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §30-2-11(4), which provides: 
A claim for the spouses' loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) Made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of the 
actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) Subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities and provisions 
applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
Section §30-2-1 l(4)(a). Relying on the language of Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) that requires a 
claim to be "[m]ade at the time the claim of injured person is made", Appellees sought 
the dismissal of Appellant's Complaint because he did not file his Complaint on the day 
Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice to Commence an Action under the Malpractice Act. 
The trial court adopted Appellee's position, and in doing so, committed reversible error. 
A. The trial court concluded that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action is malpractice action and, therefore, a "claim." 
The record is clear that to this day, Mrs. Nordgren has never filed a medical 
malpractice claim with any court. Mrs. Nordgren undertook the statutory preconditions 
to filing a claim, on June 12, 2007, by serving a Notice of Intent to Commence Action on 
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Appellees by certified mail pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-412(l) and requesting 
pre-litigation panel review. (R. at 20, R. at 37 and R. at 120.) However, Mrs. Nordgren 
never completed the pre-litigation process. Instead, she agreed to pursue her disputes 
pursuant to the terms of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. As such, she did not follow 
her Notice of Intent to Commence Action with an actual complaint. 
In the face of these undisputed facts, the trial court erroneously concluded that 
Mrs. Nordgren filed a claim on June 12, 2007, thereby triggering an obligation for 
Appellant to file his Complaint the same day under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). The 
trial court reached this result through a series of misguided conclusions. First, the trial 
court concluded that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent to Commence Action constituted a 
malpractice action, as defined by Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(16). The trial court 
compounded that error when it explained that, "[although she never filed suit in court 
because she had an arbitration agreement, Plaintiffs spouse began her action on 12 June 
2007", when she served her Notice of Intent to Commence a Claim. (R. at 127(123).) 
As the final step in the analysis, the trial court concluded, "[t]his Court finds this action a 
claim for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4)." (R. at 127(123-124).) In short, 
the trial court erroneously concluded that a Notice of Intent to Commence an Action 
equals a malpractice action under the Malpractice Act, and that a malpractice action 
equals a claim for purposes of Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). This conclusion is contrary 
to the plain language of the Malpractice Act and Utah case law. 
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B. The trial court ignored well-settled principles of statutory interpretation. 
In Smith & Sons v. Utah Labor Commission, 2009 UT 19, % 7, 218 P.3d 580, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that when determining the meaning of a statute, "a court must 
first look to the words used by the Legislature, the statute's plain language." 2009 UT 19 
at |^ 7 (citing Avis Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt, Inc., 2006 UT 45, ^ j 9, 143 
P.3d 278. The Supreme Court continued by explaining that "courts must also try to read 
the plain language of a statute as a whole, with due consideration of the other provisions 
and in an effort to interpret them in harmony with each other and 'with other statutes 
under the same and related chapters.'" Id (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ^  8, 
63 P.3d 667.) 
The trial court's decision hinges on its reliance on the Malpractice Act's definition 
of a malpractice action. In relying on that provision in the Malpractice Act, however, the 
trial court failed to consider other relevant provisions of the act that directly contradict its 
conclusions. Had it done so, and applied the standards set forth in Smith & Sons, the trial 
court would have discovered the Malpractice Act makes a clear distinction between a 
Notice of Intent to Commence an Action and malpractice action. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(16) contains the definition of a malpractice action. It 
provides: 
"Malpractice action against health care provider" means any action against a 
health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death 
or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries arising out of health care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(16). 
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A Notice of Intent to Commence Action, on the other hand, is exactly what its title 
suggests: a condition precedent to the filing of a malpractice action. Section 78B-3-
412(1) of the Malpractice Act provides: 
Notice of intent to commence action. 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider may not be initiated unless 
and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, 
at least 90 days' prior notice of intent to commence action. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-412(l) (emphasis added). After serving the Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action, a claimant must then proceed through the other pre-litigation 
requirements outlined in Sections 78B-3-416 through 78B-3-419 before she can even file 
a complaint. 
Reading these complimentary statutory provisions together, it is apparent that a 
Notice of Intent to Commence Action is not a malpractice action under the terms of the 
Malpractice Act. Several additional affirmative step must be taken, including the actual 
filing of Complaint, before an action can begin . 
C. The error in the trial court's interpretation is seen in its application. 
Applying the plain language of Section 78B-3-403(16) and Section 78B-3-412(l) 
to the facts in this case, confirms the error in the trial court's ruling. Mrs. Nordgren 
served a Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant to §78B-3-412(l). She did not 
ever follow that notice with a complaint. She instead agreed to pursue her claims outside 
3
 Tellingly, Utah appellate courts have affirmed trial courts' dismissals of complaints 
when plaintiffs served a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, yet failed to file a 
complaint within the time required by the Malpractice Act. See Kittredge v. Shaddy, 
M.D., 2001 UT 7; see also Harper v. Evans, M.D., 2008 UT App 165, 185 P.3d 573. 
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of courts pursuant to the parties Dispute Resolution Agreement4. She is currently 
engaged in that arbitration process. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial 
court erred, as a matter of law, when it concluded that Mrs. Nordgrens' Notice of Intent 
to Commence Action constitutes a malpractice action, and therefore, a "claim" for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT UTAH CODE ANN. §30-2-11(4) REQUIRED 
APPELLANT TO FILE HIS LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM ON THE 
SAME DAY HIS WIFE SERVED HER NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
COMMMENCE LITIGATION. 
Based on its conclusion that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action constitutes a malpractice action and, therefore, a claim under Utah Code Ann. 
§30-2-11(4), the trial court ruled that Appellant was required to file his loss of 
consortium claim when Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
on June 12, 2007. This interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) is contrary to Utah 
law and well-established standards of statutory interpretation. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained in State v. Jeffries, 217 P.3d 265, 
2009 UT 57, that when interpreting a statute, the court will, "first look to the plain 
language of the statute to give effect to that language unless it ambiguous." 2009 UT 57 
at 1f 7. The Supreme Court further explained two primary exceptions to this plain 
language rule. First, the duty to give meaning to the plain language "should give way if 
doing so would work a result so absurd that the legislature could not have intended it." Id 
4
 Appellant's position is consistent with the terms of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. 
Article 4(A) of that agreement plainly provides that by addressing her potential claim 
under the agreement, the statute of limitations on her ability to bring a claim is tolled. 
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at 1J 8. Second, an exception applies that requires a court "to read and interpret statutory 
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other related 
statutes... In essence, statutes should be construed... so that no part [or provision] will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy 
another." Id at ^9. 
The facts in this case bring both exceptions to the plain language rule into play. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) provides: 
A claim for the spouses' loss of consortium shall be: 
a. Made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of the 
actions shall be compulsory; and 
b. Subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities and provisions 
applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
If Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) is interpreted literally, a spouse can never have a claim for loss 
of consortium if his injured spouse resolves her claim outside of the judicial process and 
does not file a claim that can be joined. Such a reading of the statute renders other 
portions of the statute void and/or inoperable, and leads to an absurd outcome that could 
not have been intended by the legislature. As a result, Courts have read an exception into 
the language of Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) to allow a plaintiff to pursue a loss of consortium 
claim (without joining a claim) where the injured spouse has resolved her underlying 
dispute without filing suit. 
No Utah appellate court has ever addressed the ability of a spouse to bring a claim 
under Section 30-2-11(4) when the injured spouse has resolved her claims outside of the 
judicial process. However, a very similar situation was recently addressed by the United 
States District Court, Division of Utah, in Crabtree v. Woodman, 2008 WL 4276957. 
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Judge Campbell's decision in Crabtree, and the case law cited in that opinion, provide a 
clear and well-reasoned analysis of how the language contained in Section 30-2-11(4) 
should be applied to the facts in this case. 
Crabtree stems from a car accident in which Mary Crabtree was seriously injured. 
Shortly after she was injured, Mrs. Crabtree settled her claims against all defendants. 
Despite this fact, Mary Crabtree subsequently filed suit against the defendants. Her 
husband also filed a claim for loss of consortium pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-
11(4). In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asking the court to dismiss 
Ms. Crabtree's claims based on the prior settlement. The defendants also moved to 
dismiss Mr. Crabtree's claims based on the argument that, if Ms Crabtree's claims are 
dismissed, Mr. Crabtree cannot satisfy the technical requirement of Utah Code Ann. §30-
2-11(4). Specifically, the defendants argued that Mr. Crabtree could not satisfy Utah 
Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) because his wife had not filed a valid claim that could be joined. 
Judge Campbell addressed the validity of Mr. Crabtree's claims and Mrs. 
Crabtree's claims separately. In doing so, Judge Campbell ruled that Mr. Crabtree had a 
right to pursue a claim for loss of consortium even if his wife no longer had a valid claim 
that could be filed (because she had settled that claim before he ever filed suit). Judge 
Campbell relied on the Utah Supreme's Court's decision in Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Ewart, 2007 UT 52, 167 P.3d 1011, to support the key proposition that "Utah treats a loss 
of consortium claim as a separate claim belonging to the non-injured spouse". Id at 4. 
Based on this premise, Judge Campbell ruled that a spouse can pursue a loss of 
consortium claim independently, even if the injured spouse settles her claim before ever 
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filing suit. Inherent in this decision is the conclusion that a spouse can proceed with a 
claim under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) even though he does not file his claim at the 
same time as his injured wife, or join the claim of his injured wife as anticipated in Utah 
Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(4)(a). 
Without any Utah cases directly on point, Judge Campbell relied on the Minnesota 
Supreme Court Decision of Buffer v. Kozitza, 375 N.W. 2d 480, 482 (Minn. 1985). The 
analysis in Buffer is as helpful as, if not more than, the analysis in Crabtree because the 
Buffer Court more directly addresses the parallel issues involved. 
In Buffer, a husband was injured in an automobile accident with Kozitza. After 
the accident, the husband and wife divorced. Three and a half years after the accident, 
the husband settled his claims with Kozitza before he ever filed suit. The wife did not 
enter into a settlement, and subsequently filed suit against Kozitza for loss of consortium. 
Like Utah law, Minnesota law requires a spouse to join its loss of consortium claim with 
the claim of the injured party. Therefore, because the husband had previously settled his 
claim, the trial court dismissed the wife's loss of consortium claim. On appeal, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court. In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the wife had an independent claim that she was free to pursue even if the 
she could not join her ex-husband's claim. 
The Buffer court begins its analysis by explaining that as a general rule, a plaintiff 
is required to try his loss of consortium claim at the same time and in the same case as his 
wife's injury claim. When the wife has already agreed to resolve her claim through 
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settlement or other non-judicial means, however, a plaintiffs right to bring a loss of 
consortium claim outweighs the joinder requirement: 
When, therefore, the personal injury action is tried and the consortium claim is 
available to be tried with it, failure to join the consortium claim to the personal 
injury action bars the consortium claim. This is our holding in Thill. Joinder is 
required, however, only when the personal injury action is in suit, and then 
only to assure that, if the personally injury action is tried, that consortium 
action will be tried with it We decline, however, to apply the joinder 
requirement to settlements before trial. 
375 N.W. 2d at 482. (emphasis added.). 
The rationales set forth in Crabtree and Buffer squarely apply in this case. Like 
the spouses in Crabtree and Huffer, Mrs. Nordgren contractually agreed to resolve her 
disputes out of court when she signed the Dispute Resolution Agreement5. Once she did 
so, she was contractually prohibited from filing a claim in district court that could be 
joined by Appellant. Despite his wife's actions, Appellant still has an independent right 
to bring a loss of consortium claim under Utah Law. The only way that that right to bring 
an independent claim can exist, and the only way that right can be meaningful, is if the 
Appellant is allowed to pursue his own claim in District Court, while his wife pursues her 
claim outside of the judicial process. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT THE UTAH HEALTHCARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
APPLIED TO APPELLANT'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM. 
The trial court also found that the procedural requirements contained in the 
Malpractice Act applied to Appellant's claim. As Appellant's counsel argued during the 
5
 As recently explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health 
Services, 2009 UT 54, 217 P.3d 716, "Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the 
settlement of disputes..." 2007 UT 54, \ 13. 
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oral argument on this issue, such an application of the Malpractice Act is contrary to the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 9156. (R. at 
127(11-17).) 
In Dowling, the Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the 
trial court's ruling that the Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitation barred 
Dowling's claim of alienation of affection. 2004 UT 50; see also Dowling v. Bullen, 
2002 UT App 372, 58 P.3d 877. The facts of that case involve Dowling's former 
husband, James Hoagland, who attended therapy sessions with Kathleen Bullen, a social 
worker, during a time when Dowling and Hoagland were experiencing marital problems. 
During these therapy sessions, Hoagland and Bullen developed an intimate relationship 
and Hoagland ultimately filed for divorce from Dowling. In turn, Dowling sued Bullen 
for, inter alia, alienation of affection. The trial court granted Bullen's summary 
judgment motion, dismissing Dowling's claim based on its decision that her claims met 
the definition of a medical malpractice action, and, therefore, was subject to the two-year 
statute of limitation contained in the Malpractice Act. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court's decision. 
In Dowling, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling and 
reasoning and explained that not all claims fall within the purview of the Malpractice Act 
simply because they stem from the actions of a health care provider. Rather, in order for 
the Malpractice Act to apply, "the alleged malpractice must "relat[e] to or aris[e] out o f 
6
 Chad Nordgren's counsel provided the trial court with a copy of Dowling, and 
addressed the facts and the holding in Dowling during oral argument. (R. at 127 (13-16).) 
However, the trial court's Memorandum Decision does not address Dowling. 
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health care rendered "for, to or on behalf of a patient during the patients' medical care, 
treatment, or confinement." Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(10)7. In Dowling, the basis for 
Dowling's alienation of affection action was Bullen's conduct during treatment provided 
by Bullen to Hoagland, not an alleged deficiency in treatment provided by Bullen to 
Dowling. Therefore, Dowling is not the "complaining patient" and Section §78B-3-
404(1 )8 does not control. 
Appellant's loss of consortium claim should be analyzed under the holding in 
Dowling. There is no contention that Appellees provided any care to Appellant. All care 
was provided to Mrs. Nordgren, and Appellant's claims stem from that care. Therefore, 
Appellant is not a "complaining patient," and the Malpractice Act does not apply to his 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should hold that the trial court made reversible 
errors when it dismissed Appellant's claim, and that Appellant filed a valid, timely claim 
under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). Further, the Court should reverse the trial court's 
decision and remand this case to the trial court so the Appellant can continue to prosecute 
his claims. 
7
 Previously codified as Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(10). 
8
 Previously codified as Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4(1). 
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-th DATED this 6m day of December, 2009. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
idamson 
Craig A. Hoggan 
Debra Griffiths Handley 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., dba 
SEVTJER VALLEY FAMILY CLINIC, 
JEFFREY BROWN, D.O., Individually, 
ROGER D. BLOMQUIST, M.D., 
Individually, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 080600330 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
On 2 January 2009, Defendant Roger Blomquist, M.D., filed a Motion to Dismiss and a 
memorandum in support. On 31 December 2009, Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc., dba 
Sevier Valley Family Clinic (hereinafter referred to as "IHC") and Defendant Jeffrey Brown, 
D.O., filed a Joinder in Dr. Blomquist's Motion to Dismiss. On 26 January 2009, Plaintiff filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. On 12 February 2009, Defendant Dr. 
Blomquist filed a reply. On 13 February 2009, Defendants IHC and Dr. Brown filed a joinder in 
Dr. Blomquist's reply. 
On 12 February 2009, Dr. Blomquist filed a Request to Submit for Decision on his 
motion. On 1 June 2009, oral argument was heard on the motion. This motion is now ready for 
a decision. 
\ Deciftion and Order on Motion to Dismls 
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DECISION 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants argue Plaintiffs loss of consortium claim should be dismissed because 
Plaintiff was required to make his claim when his spouse asserted her claims for medical 
malpractice. Defendants rely on Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-11(4) which states: 
A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: (a) made at the time the claim of the 
injured person is made and joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and (b) subject to the 
same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the 
injured person. 
The injured person in this case is Jennie Nordgren, Plaintiff's spouse. Defendants argue 
she made her claims 12 June 2007 by filing and serving notice with the Division of Professional 
Licensing pursuant to the notice requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
(hereinafter referred to as the "UHCMA")1 Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-3-401, et seq. 
Plaintiffs claim was not included in the June 2007 notice and his claim was never joined in the 
arbitration proceedings. However, Plaintiff did provide notice of his claim on 11 September 
2008.2 
In response to Defendants9 motion, Plaintiff argues his claim is timely under Utah Code 
'Ms. Nordgren is currently pursuing her claims through arbitration. 
^Plaintiff filed this case four days later, 15 September 2008. 
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Annotated Section 30-2-11, because courts treat loss of consortium claims separately from the 
claims of an injured spouse. Crabtree v. Woodman^ Case No. 2:06-CV-946-TC (D. Utah, 11 
Sept. 2008), Plaintiff further argues a common sense reading of Section 30-2-11(4) requires a 
spouse to file a loss of consortium claim only during the same time frame as the injured spouse. 
Plaintiff claims this was his intention, and he did so by filing before the bar of the statute of 
limitations. 
Plaintiff also argues his claim could not properly have been included in the notice of 
claim filed by his spouse, because her claims are based on malpractice allegations governed by 
the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, which does not apply to third-party actions.3 Plaintiff 
insists his claim is a third-party action as defined under the UHCMA. 
Finally, Plaintiff claims allowing him to pursue his loss of consortium claim will result in 
no prejudice to Defendants. He argues this lawsuit is a separate action only because Defendants 
would not allow it to be joined in the arbitration proceedings. Plaintiff insists Defendants have 
always been aware of his claim, and that it was discussed during discovery in arbitration. 
Plaintiff claims he is a third party and the UHCMA does not apply to third parties. 
However, the Court finds Plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium is not a proper third-party 
action. "A third-party action is available only to assert a claim against 'a person not a party to the 
* 'This [notice] section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or cross claims against a health 
care provider." Utah Codu Ann. Section 78B-3-412(5). 
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action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him.'" Arnica 
UuU Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,960 (Utah Ct App, 1989).4 That is not the case here. 
Therefore, the Court finds the UHCMA applies to Plaintiff and his loss of consortium claim 
because it allegedly arises out of injury to his spouse resulting from health care provided to her 
by Defendants. 
As stated above, Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-11 requires a loss of consortium 
claim to be made at the same time the injured spouse makes his or her claim. Thus, the issue in 
this case is whether Plaintiffs spouse made a claim, for purposes of Section 30-2-11, and if so, 
when. 
The UHCMA, which governs medical malpractice actions, defines a claim as the 
following: 
""Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a health 
care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, 
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or 
which should have been rendered by the health care provider." (emphasis added) Utah 
Code Annotate Section 78B-3-403(16). 
Although she never filed suit in court because she had an arbitration agreement, Plaintiffs spouse 
began her medical malpractice action on 12 June 2007. The Court finds this action a claim for 
4
 Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defines third party practice. It states that a plaintiff can bring in a 
third party when a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff and a defendant can bring in a third party any time 
after commencement of the action when the person not a party is or may be liable to him for all or part of the 
plaintiffs claim against him. 
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puiposes of Section 30-2-11, 
Though his wife filed her claim on 12 June 2007, Plaintiff did not assert his claim for loss 
of consortium until 11 September 2008 when he sent his notice of claim to Defendants. This 
was more than 15 months after his wife initially filed her notice of claim. Therefore, the Court 
concludes Plaintiffs claim was not "made at the time the claim of the injured person [was] 
made" Section 30-2-11(4). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[statutory enactments are to be construed as to 
render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Aris Vision Inst, Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt, 
143 P.3d 278,281 (Utah 2006). Also, 44[s]ubsections of a statute should not be construed in a 
vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a whole." Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P,2d 
707, 709 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff, asserts that by filing his claim within the statute of limitations he has satisfied 
the statutory requirements and can pursue his loss of consortium claim. The Court does not 
agree with this interpretation. If the legislature had intended that a spouse need only file a loss 
of consortium claim within the statute of limitations then it would not have included the 
language that the claim be filed when the injured person makes his or her claim. Therefore, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff has not met the statutory requirements of Section 30-2-11 and his loss 
of consortium claim should be dismissed. 
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The Court concludes Plaintiff failed to follow the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-2-11. Plaintiff's claim was not made at the time his wife's claim was made. 
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium is 
dismissed. 
DATED this 2g^L day of ~hdL , 20j2J_-
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Craig A. Hoggan 
Debra Griffiths Handley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JoAnn E. Bott 
Julia M. Houser 
David C. Castleberry 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Health Services 
and Defendant Brown 
170 South Main Street, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
George T. Naegle 
Anne D. Armstrong 
Attorneys for Defendant Blomquist 
P.O. Box 2465 
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Article 1 Hisp3Uf Kesotofini) , 
By siping this Agreement ("Agreement3') we are agreeing ID resolve any Claim for medical malpractice by the dispute resolution 
process described in this Agreement Under this Agreement you can pursue your Claim and seeJk damages, but you are waiving your 
right to nave it decided by a judge or jury 
Article 2 Definitions 
A. The term "we," "parties* or "us" means you, (the Patient), and the Provider. 
B. The term "Claim*1 means one or more Malpractice Actions defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Utah Code 7S-14-
3(15)) Bach party may use any legal process to resoJvc non-medical malpractice claims. 
C. The term "provider" means IHC Health Services, Inc. ("KG") and any person or entity employed by IHC as well as independent 
persons or entities not employed by IHC whose practice is primarily m an IHC hospital or facility (such as anesthesiologists, 
radiologists, pathologists, emergency room physicians, etc ). 
D. The tenn "Patient77 or "you* means: 
(3) you and any person who makes a Claim for care given-to YOU, such as your kens, your spouse, children, parents or legal 
representatives, AND 
(2) your unborn child or newborn child for care provided during the 12 months immediately following the date you 4gn this 
Agreement, or any person "who makes^ a OJaimfor care given to that unborn or newborn «chUd. 
Articles DisputeKegrttttifffl Options 
A. fcffiftads Available fhrErtsputft Resnlution. We agree to resolve any Claim by: 
(1) working directly with each other to try :snd find a soJution that resolves the Claim, OP. 
(2) using non-binding mediation (each of-us wHl bear one-twif of the costs) ;-OR 
(3) using binding arbitration as described in this Agreement 
You may choose lo use any or all of these methods to resolve your Chjxcu 
B. t.*g*1 rvwMri. Each of us may choose to be represented by legal counsel during any stage of the dispute resolution process, but 
each of us will pay the fees and costs of our own attorney. 
C. Arbitration -Final reasnfytfon If working with the Provider or using non-binding mediation does not resolve your Claim, we 
agree that your Claim will be resolved through binding arbitration. We both agree that the decision reached in binding arbitration 
will be final. 
Articled How to Arbitrate a Claim 
A. Note - To make a Claim under lhis Agreement, mail a -written notice to n>e Provider by certified -mail that briefly describes the 
nature of your Claim (the "Notice"), If the Notice is sentto the Provider by certified mail it will suspend (toll) the applicable 
statute of limitations during the dispute resolutionpsocess described in this Agreement 
B. Arbitrators Within 30 days of receiving the Notice, the Provider will contact you. If you and the Provider cannot resolve the 
Claim by working together or.through mediation, we will start the process of choosing arbitrators. There will be three arbitrators, 
unless we agree that a single •arbitrator may resolve the Claim. 
(1) Appoint Arbitrators. You will appoint an arbitrator of your choosing and all Providers will jointly appoint an arbitrator of 
their choosing. 
(2) loiatly-Selttcieri Arbitrator. You and die Provider^) wjj] then jointly appoint an arbitrator (the "Jointly-Selected 
Arbitrator'1)* If you and the Providers) cannot agree upon a Jointly-Selected Arbitrator, the arbitrators appointed by each oT 
the parties will choose the Jointly-Selected Arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal 
courts of Utah. If the arbitrators cannot-agree on-a Jointly-Selecied Arbitrator, either or both of us may request that a Utah 
court select an individual from Che lists described above. Each party will pay their own fees and costs in such an action. The 
Jointly-Selected Arbitrator will preside over the arbitration hearing and have all other powers of an arbitrator as set forth in 
the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. 
C Ariairation Expend You will pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator you appoint and the Providers) will *p*ay the fecs,and 
costs of the arbhratorthe Providers) appoints Each of us will also pay one-half of the fees, and expenses of the Jointly-Selected 
Agitator a 3 ^ y ^ ^ ^ c n s e s , a f Jtbe f # & 6 j p j ^ a n ^ 
D
* Pinal anriftmffing Ytefiiwm A niajonty of ike thro triSrators will make a final decision or* the Claim. The decision shall be 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Arbitration ACL 
nnn 
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& \)\ rflwms May be. 3nmed> Any pers^a or entity that could be appropriately named in *- courc proceeding ("Joined Party") is 
entitled toparticipare in this arbitration as long as that person or entity agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision (u3oinder*). 
Joinder may dso include Claims against persons or entities that provided care, prior to the-sigoing date of this Agreement A 
"Joined Party" does not participate in the selection of the arbitrators but is considered a "Provider" for all other purposes of this 
Agreement 
Artide5 Liability and Pamag^May Bs A£hiteatej3..Separatcly 
Ac the request of either party, the issues of liability and damages wil) be arbitrated separately. If the arbitration panel finds liability, 
the parties may agree to either continue to arbitrate damages with the initial panel or cither pzrfy may cause that a second panel be 
selected for considering damages. However, if a second panel is selected, the Jointly Selected arbitrator will remain the same and 
will continue .to preside over the arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise, 
Articled Y&me../ Governing Law 
The arbitration hearings wjlj be held in a place agreed to by the parties. If the parties cannot agree, the hearings will be held hi Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Arbitration proceedings are private and shall be kept confidential. The provisions of the Utah Uniform A^bltratj^ 
Act and the Federal Arbitration Act govern this Agreement We hereby waive the prclkigatLon panel review requirements. The 
arbitrators will apportion fault io all persons or entities thai; contributed to the injury claimed by the Patient, whether or .not those 
persons or entities are parties to the arbitration. 
ion 
Article 7 T&™ / fteBctyttion / Termination 
A- Terrr\, This Agreement j$ binding on both of us for one year from the date you sign it unless you rescind it If it is not rescinded, 
it will automatically renew everyjear unless either parry notifies the other in writing of a decision to terminate it. 
B. ftgqcjsflifln. Yon may rescind this Agreement within ID t&ys of signing It by. sending written notice by registered^.certified mail 
to the Provider. The effective date of the rescission notice will be the date It is postmarked. The notice shall be mailed to M1HC 
Arbitration" EO: Box 112412, Salt Lake City UT 84147-0412 and must include youpnamer-birtkdate;andsignatee; If not 
rescinded* this Agreement will govern all medical services received by the Padent from Provider after die date o f signing, sxcept 
in the case of a Joined Party that provided care prior to the signing of tins agreement (sec Article 4(E)), 
C. TfrTWnafiQn' ff r^e Agreement has not been rescinded, either party may stjjl terminate it as any time, hut termination will not take 
effect until the next anniversary of the signing of the Agreement To terminate this Agreement, send written notice by registered 
or certified mail to the Provider at: P.O. Box 112412, Salt Lake City, JT $4147-0412.You must include your name, birth date 
and signature. This Agreement applies to any Claim that arises while it is in effect, even if you file a Claim or request arbitration 
after the Agreement has been isxniiaaf ed. 
Articles Sgasrabilijj: 
If any part of this Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions -will remain in Mi force and will not be 
affected by the invalidity of airy other provision* 
Article 9 Acknowledgement of W r i t e r Explanation of ArhHrefam 
I have xaceiy£da.writtenexplanatfon nftbe terms of this Agreement I have had the right to ask questions and have my questions 
answered, J understand that any Claim I might have must be resolved through the dispute resolution procoss w this Agreement 
instead of haying them heard by a judge or jury, I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in which they are selected. I 
understand ihe responsibility for arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement renews each year unless cancelled before 
the renewal date. I understand that I can decline io enter into the Agreement and still receive health care. I understand that 1 am 
rescind this Agreement within 10 days of signing it. 
Article 10 ftessiptttf 0)py.~- I have received a copy of this document. 
ZHC Health Services, Inc. xWtflk 
cfcJLW 
By: Charles W. Sorenson, MJD. 
T6^xe^uve^cefcPrcsJdent/COO 
Name of Postal (Print) £L 
LJJL Ik Zfi foj&ff^rN />*rCLjp 
Signage of Paricnt or Patient's RrpxescptaHv^  '""""tPaS^  ^-r^-*"-***"" * 
XHCRMttJ/*^* 
For office use only; MF>fcm_ 
Vera 427ft* 
